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Finonciol Llberolisolion ond Finonciol Frogility ln Nlgerlo
Bobolde Fowowe, Ph.d'
Abdrocl
Nigeio's finonciol liberolisolion slofted in 1987 but lhis wos followed by o bonking cnsis. the
expedences of countuies such os Nigerio which hove expeienced bonkng crises
immediotely ofter finonciol liberolistion hove prompled some oulhors to poit thot
liberolifrtion is respons,ble for finonciol ftogilily ond bonkng cn.sis. Using on index which
meosures the goduol progression ond irstitutionol chonges invo,ved in finonciol
liberolisotion, this poper conducls on empiicol evoluolion of the impoct of finonciol
,ibero,isotion on finonciol frogifity in Nigerio. lhe results show lhat liberolisolion hos exerfed
o ignificonl negotive eftect on finonciol fragilw in both the shod run ond long run.
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l.
lnhoductlon
Nigerion government emborked upon finonciol liberolisolion os port of ils
The
belief thot freeing up
I' Structurol Adjustment Progromme (SAP) in 1987 with the growth.
finonciol morkets would help in stimuloting economic
There wos o
bonking crisis in the immediole oftermolh of the finonciol liberolisotion. The
deregulotion of inlerest rotes in 1993 resulled in o wide increose in lhe inleresl
role spreod ond the increosed lending roles mode it difficult for smoll ond
medium scole enlerprises to secure loons. ln oddilion, the reloxotion of entry into
bonking resulled in lhe widespreod esioblishmenl of bonks which were poorlymonoged ond strelched the regulolory copocilies of the Centrol Bonk of Nigerio
(CBN). The bonking crisis wos ol its most severe stoge between l99l ond 1995
ond by 1993, insolvent bonks occounted lor 20 percent of lotol ossets ond 22
percenl of bonking system deposits (Coprio ond Klingebiel, 1995). Vorious
meosures were pul in ploce to cope wilh ihe crisis which included esloblishmenl
of o deposit insuronce scheme, re-reguloting inleresl roies, slrengthening lhe
regulotory powers of the CBN ond legislolions enhoncing the speedy triol of ening
bonking officiols.

ln lhis poper we conduct on empiricol evoluotion of lhe effects of finonciol
liberolisotion on finonciol frogiliiy in Nigerio. Finonciol liberolisotlon hos been
recognised os o key foctor responsible for finonciol frogility ond bonking crises
(Dioz - Alejondro, 1985; Demirguc - Kunt ond Deirogioche. 1999; Kominsky ond
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Reinhort, 1999). However, some oulhors hove shown thot such frogility ofier
liberolisotion occur only in the short-run ond lhot finonciol liberolisotion promoles
slobility ond growth in the long-run (Kominsky ond Schmukler. 2002; Loofzo ond
Ronciere, 2OO4i lornell ond Westermonn,2004). Thus. we oim lo test the effects of
finonciol liberolisotion on finonciol frogility in the long-run. We hove developed on
index of finonciol liberolisolion which meosures lhe differenl phoses of ihe
deregulolion ond instilulion building process involved in finonciol liberolisotion.
This index is lhen included os on explonotory vorioble in o finonciol frogility
equotion lo exomine the effecls of liberolisolion on finonciol frogility in Nigerio.
The rest of this poper is orgonised os follows. The nexi seclion provides o review of
lhe literoture ond seclion 3 gives on overview of Nigerio's finonciol sector. The
onolyticol fromework is presented in seclion 4 ond lhis is followed by lhe
econometric onolysis in seclion 5. The losl seclion concludes the poper.

ll.
ll.I

Uterofure Revlew
Rovlaw o, Theory
The theorelicol link between finonciol liberolisotion ond economic growlh hos
been identified by mony oulhors such os Schumpeler (1912), McKinnon (,l973),
Show (1973), Golbis (1977), ond Pogono (1993). Schumpeter (1912) discords the
common belief ot lhol lime thol money's sole funclion wos o medium of
exchonge ond nothing else. This view wos summed up in lhe notion "lhot the
creotion of money is merely o technicol molier, wiih no deeper significonce for
lhe generol theory of economic life" (Schumpeter i912, p.I00). He disogrees with
Ricordo's belief thol bonks connot conlribute to the process of weolth creolion
but osserts thot bonks - ond indeed oll finonciol intermediories - ore creoled not
only for lronsporling money bul olso for groniing credit.

Schumpeler osserls thol creolion of credit by bonks is essentiol for economic
development, ond mokes lhe ossumption thol only the entrepreneur needs
credit. Credit provides the enlrepreneur wilh purchosing power without which, it
would be impossible to produce. Credil con therefore be seen to feed induslriol
development. However, credil does not .iust come outomoticolly bul hos to be
bonowed ond this con be done only lhrough finonciol intermediories. Finonciol
intermediories ore seen to perform the role of bridging the gop between
products ond meons of production ond they ochieve this by providing lhe
enlrepreneur with purchosing power. Economic developmeni con then proceed
once the entrepreneur hos been empowered by credit.

McKinnon (1973) ond Show (1973) proiected the onolysis thot finonciol
liberolisolion wos needed to remedy lhe problems coused by finonciol repressive
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policies of developing counlries. McKinnon ond Show both idenlified finonciol
repression os o regime consisting of the imposition of interest-role ceilings, foreignexchonge regulotions, dkecl credit ollocotion policies, high reserve requirements.
ond heovy toxotion of the finonclol seclor. They identified mony developing
countries os pursuing such policies, which hod the effect of retording economic
growth in lhe long run. Such policies lhey bolh orgued resulled in shollow finonce,
which reduced the reol size of the finonciol system ond, consequenlly, hompered
its role of efficient mobilisotion ond ollocotion of resources. McKinnon ond Show
nole thot the problem wilh logging economies is not lock of investmenl
opportunities but unotlroctive sovings. A moin feolure of shollow finonce is thot
lhe low level of interesl roles discouroges ogents from soving ond consequenfly,
lhis mokes copitol for investment hord to come by. Logging economies ore olso
choroclerised by monipulotion of prices in virtuolly oll morkets.

Golbis (1977) extended the onolysis of McKinnon ond Show. He exomines on
economy comprised of two production seciors with controsling finonciol
conslroints ond technologicol processes, but which produce lhe some oulput.
There ore lwo sectors: o less efficient sector ond o more efficient sector which is
more technologicolly odvonced ond hos higher rotes of return on invesiment.
With low deposit roles of inieresl becouse of finonciol repression, investment will
loke ploce in the less efficient sector os ii would be more profitoble for fkms to
invesl rother thon increose thek bonk deposils. Credit will not flow to lhe more
efficienl sector. However, with increosed deposit roles following finonciol
liberolisotion, the low return on investment in the less efficienl sector meons thot
firms would prefer to increose lheir bonk deposits - by reducing investmenl - ond
this increoses credii flowing to the more efficient secior. The higher role of return
on investment in the more efficient secior meons thot the quolity of investmenl
will increose, ond this will increose economic growth.
The importonce of finonciol development to growth hos olso been highlighted in

lhe endogenous growlh models. The endogenous growth lheories emphosise the
role of finonciol intermediories in economic growth. They show how there con be
self-susioining long-run growlh os o result of liberolised finonciol morkets ond
better functioning finonciol iniermediories. The influence of finonciol morkets on
economic growih con be best seen in the simplest of lhese endogenous growth
models. The model of Pogono (1993) moy be ulilised to moke the point. ln lhis
fromework the 'AK' model, in which oggregote output is o lineor funclion of lhe
oggregote copitol stock, con be expressed os:
Yt = AKt

(1)
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Pogono (1993) ossumes firstly thot the populotion is stotionory. He olso ossumes
lhot o single good is produced in lhe economy, which con be consumed or
invested (io depreciote ot the role of 6 per period); ond thirdly, he ossumes thol
o proportion (l-9) of the flow of soving is losl during finonciol inlermediotion.
Following from these ossumplions, gross investmeni con be expressed in the form
below:

h=Kr*r-(l-6)Kr
Copilol morket equilibrium
<pSr

is

(21

given by:
(3)

= li

This follows from combining lhe thkd ossumption with the copilol morkel
equilibrium condition (soving = investment) thoi rules in o closed economy with
no govemment.
From equotion 12) lhe growlh role of output, Y,

gr'r = Yr.r/Yr-

1 = (1+1/Kr

-

ol time i + 1 will now be:

1

equolion (3) ond dropping the lime indices the steody-slofe growth rote
now
con
be expressed os:
Using

g=
where s = S/Y

is

1L-5 = 1$-5

14l

the gross soving role.

Equolion (4) shows thot finonciol developmenl con offect growlh in three woys:
(o)

lmproving lhe ollocolion of copilol - by roising A, lhe sociol morginol
produclivity of copilol, finonciol intermediories improve lhe ollocotion of
copitol. This con be done in two principol woys: fiml, by inducing
individuols lo invest in riskier bul more productive lechnologies by
providing risk-shoring opportunilies; ond second, by collecting
informotion ond moking sure thol lhe most productive investments ore
finonced.
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(b)

Chonnelling funds to firms - by roising e, lhe proporlion of soving
chonnelled to investment, inlermediories con help to increose the growth
role g.

(c)

Affecting the sovings roie - by roising s, the privole sovings rote, the
finonciol system increoses the resources ovoiloble for copilol
occumulotion, ond given thol returns lo copitol ore non-decreosing, the
finonciol syslem con permonenfly roise the rote of growth of oulpul per
copilo.

The link between finonciol liberolisolion ond finonciol frogility hos been
highlighted by some outhors such os Dell'Ariccio ond Morquez (2005), Ronciere,
et ol. [2005], ond Demirguc-Kunt ond Delrogioche (1999).
Dell'Ariccio ond Morquez (2005) showed thol finonciol liberolisolion con increose
the incidence of finonciol crisis through o number of woys. The first ovenue reloles
to o chonging informotion structure of flnonciol morkels. When lhe number of
bonowers whose finonciol ond credit hislory ore unknown lo lhe bonks increoses,
there is more compeiition in credit morkels ond bonks stop screening ond credil
is gronted to oll bonowers. with increosing ond indiscriminote lending, coupled
with the focl lhot il is only credit gronted to known bonowers thot yield positive
profits, bonks ore increosingly exposed lo risk, ond the probobility of o crisis
increoses. Second, finonciol liberolisotion, through copitol occount liberolisoiion,
con induce copilol inflows which could result in o foll in deposit interest roles.
Such o foll in bonks' costs of funds could resull in less stringent lending rules ond,
consequenfly, leod io o lending boom which would increose finonciol frogility.
Another woy through which finonciol liberolisotion could induce frogility is through
lhe reloxotion of entry into bonking. lncaeosed compet;tion from new entronls
forces the incumbenl (which could be o monopoly or oligopoly) lo lower lending
slondords ond desist from screening of bonowers to pooling. This will increose
credit but ot the some time, reduce the bonk's loon portfolio ond profils which
would increose finonciol vulnerobility. The implicotion of lhe obove is thol
increosed credit due to indiscriminole lending couses deteriorotion in the loon
porlfolio of bonks ond reduces profils. The lending boom olso mokes the bonking
system vulneroble to mocroeconomic shocks becouse increosed lending mokes
bonks' profils sensitive to fluctuotions. The overoll effecl is thot the probobiliiy of
finonciol frogility increoses following finonciol liberolisolion.
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Demirguc-Kunt ond Detrogioche ( 1999) show thot finonciol liberolisoiion
increoses interest role risk which con increose bonking crisis. This is becouse
interest rote deregulolion resulling in increoses in short-term inlerest rotes meons
lhol bonks hove to increose deposil inleresi rotes. However, they will not be oble
to increose lending roles becouse most long-term loons hove fixed interest roles.
Thus, bonks will be forced lo incur losses or ot best record lower profits becouse
the interest roies on loons connol be odiusled quickly. ln oddition to lhis, even if
lending roles con be increosed under shorl nolice, this would couse on increose
in non-performing loons. Thus, higher interesl rotes resulling from finonciol
liberolisotion would increose finonciol frogility. Furthermore, lhe removol of
interest rote ceilings meons thot loons to high risk bonowers will become possible
ond could even be profitoble. This is becouse bonks con chorge higher interest
rotes for high risk bonowers ond, thus, the proportion of high-rhk loons will
increose. The liberolisolion of finonciol morkets reloxes bonk supervision ond
regulolion which could result in imprudenl proclices by bonks. The esloblishmenl
of o deposit insuronce scheme con olso resull inlo o crisis if bonks resort to morol
hozord behoviour ond lend to customers who ore not credit worthy since they
feel thot the deposil insuronce will boil them out in the event of ony crisis.

ll,2 Revlew o, Empl col ljlorofure
A number of sludies hove been conducted to

empiricolly exomine lhe
relotionship between bonking crisis or finonciol frogility on one hond, ond
finonciol liberolisotion on the other hond. There seems to be o consensus from
lhese sludies thol finonciol liberolisotion increoses the incidence of bonking crisis
ond leods 10 frogility of the finonciol sector. A review of some of the empiricol
lileroture

is

provided below.

Demirguc-Kunt ond Dekogioche (.1998) conducted o study to exomine the
delerminonts of bonking crisis using o somple of 65 developing ond developed
couniries. The oulhors employed dolo over the period I 980 - 1994 ond lhe
eslimotion involved the use of o mullivoriote logil model. The dependenl vorioble
is o dummy vorioble for bonking crisis where the dummy lokes on o volue of zero
if there is no crisis ond lhe volue of one if there is o crisis. Explonotory vodobles
employed include ihe rolio of privole credii lo GDP os o prory for finonciol
liberolisolion, the growth role of reol GDP, ierms of lrode, reol short-term inlerest
rote, inflotion, rote of depreciotion of the exchonge rote, ond rotio of bonk cosh
ond reserves to bonk ossets. other voriobles ore o dummy vorioble for deposit
insuronce, indexes of the quolity of inslilulions, ond per copito GDP. The resulls of
eslimotion showed o significonl posilive effect of the privole credil rotio on the
probobility of bonking crisis, thereby, implying thol finonciol liberolisotion hos
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increosed the incidence of bonking crisis in the counlries. Olher voriobles which
hod o significont positive effect on ihe probobility of bonking crisis ore the reol
inleresl roie, inflotion, ond deposil insuronce. The voriobles thot were significontly
negotively reloted to the probobility of bonking crisis ore growlh rote of reol GDP,
terms of trode, per copito GDP, ond voriobles thot coptured low ond order.
Demirguc-Kunt ond Detrogioche (1999) conducted o study using doto for 53
countries to exomine the relolionship between finonciol liberolisolion ond
finonciol frogility. The study period covered 1980 - 1995 ond o multivoriote logit
model wos used to exomine lhe probobility of o bonking crisis. The dependenl
vorioble wos o dummy vorioble for bonking crisis ond the primory explonotory
vorioble wos o finonciol liberolisotion dummy vorioble. The finonciol liberolisolion
vorioble tokes on o volue of zero prbr to removol of interesl rote controls ond o
volue of one ofter removol of interest rote conirols. Other explonolory voriobles
include the growth rote of reol GDP, terms of trode, reol short-term interest role,
inflotion, role of depreciotion of the exchonge rote, rolio of bonk cosh ond
reserves to bonk ossets, o dummy vorioble for deposit insuronce, indexes of the
quolity of institutions, ond per copiio GDP. The results showed o significont
positive coefficient for the finonciol liberolisolion vorioble, thus implying thot
finonciol liberolisotion is o significont foclor leoding lo finonciol frogility. Other
voriobles which hod significont posilive coefficienls ore the reol interest rofe,
inflolion, ond logged totol credit growth. The voriobles which were negotively
coneloted with finonciol frogility were reol GDP growih, terms of trode, ond per

copilo

GDP.

Tornell ond Westermonn (2004) sfudy sought to exomine the relolionship between
finonciol liberolisolion ond finonciol frogility. The outhors employed doto for 52

countries over the period 1980 - 1999. The dependent vorioble is finonciol frogility
which is defined os lhe negoiive skewness of credil growth. Finonciol liberolisotion
is meosured by on index which coptures o more liberolised finonciol system if
cumulotive copitol inflows exceed l0 percenl of GDP or if such series experience
o hend b,reok. The outhors found thol finonciol liberolisotion is ossocioled wiih on
increose in lhe meon of credil growth ond o foll in lhe skewness of credit growlh.
This hos lhe implicotion thol finonciol liberolisotion leods 1o increosed finonciol
frogility.

Looyzo ond Ronciere (2004) employed the pooled-meon group estimotor lo
exomine lhe effecls of finonciol inlermediotion ond finonciol liberolisotion on
economic growth ond finonciol crisis. The oulhors used dolo for 75 countries over
the period 1950 - 2000. The results of estimoiing growth regression showed thol
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finonciol inlermediotion hos hod o negotive effect on economic growih in the
short-run bul lhe relolionship hos been posilive in the long-run. Using the stondord
deviotion of lhe growlh role of the rotio of privote seclor credit lo meosure
finonciol voloiility orising from finonciol liberolisolion, the outhors found thot
finonciol vololility increoses the incidence of bonking crisis ond this hos hod on
odverse effect on economic growth. The oulhors concluded thot finonciol
liberolisotion increoses finonciol volotility ond this increoses lhe incidence of
bonking crisis.

lll,

Overvlew of the Nlgedon flnonclol Seclor
The bonking system in Nigerio effectively slorled with the esloblishment of the
Africon Bonking Corporolion in 1892. Two yeors ofler the estoblishmenl of the
Africon Bonking Corporotion, the Eonk of British West Africo (BBWA) (now colled
Fksi Bonk) wos estoblished ond lhis new bonk ocquired the Africon Bonking
Corporotion. Other bonks lhot were estoblished in this eorly period were lhe
Anglo-Africon Bonk in 1905r, Borcloys Bonk Dominion, Coloniol ond Overseos in
I 9l 7 (now colled Union Bonk) ond the British ond French Bonk in I 949 (now colled
Uniled Bonk for Africo). The eorly period of bonking in Nigerio wos choroclerised
by lox regulolions ond there were virtuolly no restriclions or lows guiding the
estoblishmenl of bonks.2

The first indigenous bonk wos the lndushiol Commerciol Bonk which wos
estoblished in 1929. Olher eorly indigenous bonks were the Nigerion Mercontile
Bonk estoblished in 1931, Notionol Bonk of Nigerio estoblished in 1933, Tinubu
Properties Limiled in I 937 which loter become the Africon Coniinenlol Bonk,
Agbonmogbe Bonk esioblished in 1945, ond Nigerion Formers ond Commerciol
Bonk which wos set up in 1947 .Ihere wos o boom in lhe estoblishmenl of bonks
from the lote l94Os inio the eorly 1950s but most of ihese bonks did not lost long
ond foiled wilhin o few yeors. Generolly, mony of the indigenous bonks did not
survive, while lhe expolriole bonks fored better. The reosons for this included lhe
foct lhot mony of these indigenous bonks locked lhe monogeriol expertise lo
effeclively run the bonks. Another reoson wos the focl thot the foreign bonks
were linked lo lheir heod-offices in developed counlries, ond lhey hod occess to
more copitol ond most of lhe indigenous bonks could no, compeie wilh them.

of

bonks necessitoled the need for regulolion, A
commission of inquiry - Poton Commission - wos then set up in 1948 io investigote

The widespreod foilure

rlhe nome ot lhis bonk wos chonged lo Bonk of Nlgedo ond il wos loter ocqulred by the BBWA
4he only restrictlon wos thql they could not lssue Bonk of Englond notes
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Nigerio ond recommend oppropriote octions needed for the
regulotion of the industry. The government octed on the recommendotions of the
Poton Commission in 1952 when it enocted the 1952 Bonking Ordinonce. Despite
ihe foct thot the 1952 Bonking Ordinonce put some regulotory conhol into lhe
bonking industry, there were still o lot of concerns lhol more needed to be done.
First, il wos fell thot the expotriole bonkJ exerted too much conkol over bonking
octivilies ond ihot they were not fovourobly disposed to the developmentol
needs of lhe country. They were seen more os ovenues for the expotriole
componies lo obtoin funds ond did not serve indigenes well. There wos olso no
recognised body to conduct regulolory ond supervisory octivities in this seclor.
bonking

There wos no centrol bonk ond the body thot wos responsible for issuing currency

wos the Wesi Africon Cunency Boord (WACB). All these concems resulted in lhe
governmenl setting up the Loynes Commission in 1958 ond following the
submission of the report of this commission, lhe Centrol Bonk Ordinonce of 1958
wos enocted which estoblished lhe Cenlrol Bonk of Nigerio.
The Centrol Bonk of Nigerio {CBN) storted operotions on the lst of July 1959 with
on oulhorised copitol of N3.0 million which wos poid by the Federol Govemment.
The 1950s morked the beginning of the CBN'S regulotory control of bonking in

Nigerio. There were o number of omendmenls 1o lhe 1958 Ordinonce, oll of
which resulted in more stringent bonking regulolions ond restrictions lo entry. For
instonce, omendments to the 1958 Ordinonce were mode in 1961. 1952, ond
1954 ond o new decree wos enocted with the 1969 Bonking Decree. All lhese
bonking legislolions furlher reguloled bonking ond noioble developments were
lhe increose of poid-up copilol for bonks, guidelines regording liquidotion of
bonks, ond stipulotion of copitol-deposit rotios.
Finonciol liberolisotion storled in Nigerio in 1987. The liberolised policies induced o
flurry of octivilies in the finonciol seclor. Mosl nolok y, lhere wos o big increose in
Jhe number of bonks operoting in the counlry. The number of commerciol bonk

operoting in the country doubled from 29 lo 65 between 1985 ond '1992, while the
number of bronches increosed from 1367 to 2275. However. lhere wos o
disproportionole concentrolion of bonk bronches in the urlf,on oreos os opposed
io the rurol oreos with obout twice os mony bonk bronches in the urbon oreos to
the rurol oreos. ln oddition to lhis, the number of merchont bonks hod
quodrupled by the mid-1990s from 12 in 1986 io 5l in 1997.
With the proliferolion of bonks in the oftermoth of finonciol liberolisolion, lhere
wos on increose in the omouni of loons gronled by bonks. Bonks' loons ond
odvonces increosed from |+46.9 billion in 1987 lo ft57.6 billion in 1990. ond ihen to
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|1550 billion by 2000 (Toble ll. The toble olso shows thot the composition of
bonks loons between lhe privole ond public sectors hos been flucluoling since
liberolisotion. The credit provided by bonks to lhe privote sector wos greoter thon
credil to lhe public sector immediotely ofter liberolisotion from 1987 to 1991. This
wos reversed trom l?92 lo 1995 when credit to the public seclor exceeded
privote sector credit, bul this ogoin chonged from 1996 ond privote sector credit
hos since been lorger lhon public sector credil.

over

ond Stein (2002) idenlified two moior foctors thoi induced the increose in
lhe number of bonks operoting in lhe country ofler liberolisotion. The foctors ore
the liberolisotion of the copilol occount ond the obolilion of import licensing.
These two policies limiled the degree of rent-seeking in the economy, but with
liberolisotion come the duol foreign exchonge mechonism where only bonks
were ollowed lo buy foreign cunency ot on officiol roie which they lhen sold ot
the oulonomous/premium role. This resulled in o shift in the potlern of renlseeking from Jrode to finonciol services. Bonking licences were gronled bosed on
politicol connections ond the CBN's role wos reduced to lusi gronling licences.
Lewis

Toble l:Bonklng Sy3tcm Credll To The Economy
YEAR

BAI{KII{G SYSTEM CREDIT (N MII.IIOII} TO:

Economy
1980

fi747.5

1981

L9a2

16268.5
21906.8

19&!

22t42.1

tgu

19{X)

31141.6
32680.3
36820.3
45925.4
57326.3
49?59.L
57674.9

1991

83E23.1

1992

77LO1L,L

1993

2ffi57.6

1994

1999

439113.8
47436L.4
332301.2
32L2L6,4
485589.7
632010.1

20@

ffi162L.7

1985

1986
L9A7

1988
1989

1995
1996
1997
1998

Privdte

Sector

Public Sector

z!.7

65t4.3

s0.8
34.7
28.7
10.s
4.9

10535.3
15828.2
18199.6
18980.1
19455.3

25476.r

2t450.3

29773.6
30942.8
36631
45125,2
79958.9
95489.7

27552.7
1a315.3

2113s8.6
221335.6
274958.4
35L760.7
4s5205.2
596911.5

Economy

3596.6

7L90.9
54.2
11371.5
11353.9
12942
L37@.2
L7355

$1mo.3

GROWTH OF CREOlr (%)TO:

17.7
27,4
22.2
.L4.L

Private s€ctor Public secto,
32.4
4.1
84,1
34.3
17.E
59.3
8.6
50.3
i[.8
15
4.3
5,9
26.7
46.7

2.5
10.3

24.4
-33.5

210{3.9

L7.t

16.9
3.9
18.4

3849E.s

45.3

23.1

14.9
82.9

9tlt2.2

65

4

,36.7

185157.9
284113.5

74.?

L03.2

26302.8

8.1
-25,4
-3.3
51.2
30

110465.5
46254.4

t33929

2m1

848$2.9

8At999.4

175804.9
71620.2
-6005.5

2@2

L394422.1

1023783,s

313639.2

79.t9

L9.7
47.5
47.3
21.8
23.9
27,9
29.19
:t0.9
43.5

,6

L9.7

8.1

-2i.L

Source: CBN Mojor Economic, Finonciol ond Bonking lndicolors, 200,t

+.7
8.7
-58
-58

18t.9
32.01
-162.3
95.15
-5320.6
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By 1991, the finonciol sector wos experiencing

o bonking crisis, but the signs of the
unstoble ond volotile nolure of the seclor hod storted to emerge in the lote 1980s
when il come lo lhe otlention of the oulhorities lhot 8 bonks (oul of the 56 bonks
operoting then) were lechnicolly insolvenl. The government look some steps lo
bolster regulotion ond lhe Nigerio Deposil lnsuronce Corporotion (NDIC) wos
creoled in 1988 lo complement lhe CBN's efforts in bonking supervision ond ihe
NDIC wos primorily chorged with insuring deposils ond wilh bonk inspection.
Other prudentiol initiolives were the increose in lhe minimum poid-up shore
copitol for oll bonks in l99l .3 This period olso sow vorying degrees of reversols of
the finonciol liberolisotion policy. lnlerest rote controls were re-introduced in l99l
but were ogoin de-conlrolled in 1992. The CBN olso stopped furlher bonk
licensing in eorly 1991, coupled wilh new prudentiol guidelines on osset quolity
lhot were pul in ploce which required belter ond more tronsporent occounting
ond loon clossificoiion from bonks. The CBN Act, ond the Bonks ond Olher
Finonciol lnslitulions Act were promulgoted in June I 991 to strengthen lhe CBN's
regulotory powers ond gronted the CBN more power in licensing bonks ond
sonctioning foiling bonk. Despite lhese new steps, the CBN wos still effeclively
onsweroble to lhe Presidency ond the lock of independence hompered ils
etfeclive prudentiol regulotion ond supervision of bonks. The CBN wos used more
by the govemment lo service iis excessive budget deficits which exceeded l0
percenl of GDP between I 991 ond I 993.
Brownbridge (1998) noies thot 60 percent of the toiol loon portfolios of sloteowned bonks were non-performing in 1994.The bonks were olso subiect to high
operoting costs wilh ihe siole-owned bonks incurring costs of 76 percenl of nei
eomings os ogoinst 49 percenl for olher bonks (Brownbridge, 1998). Between
1993 ond 1996, over Nl billion hod been involved in frouds ond forgeries in bonks
(Aloshi,2002). The new prudentiol guidelines introduced in l99l mode sure bonks
odequotely clossified non-performing loons ond lhis provided the fkst indicotion
of the exlent of decoy in the industry. Slote-owned commerciol bonks' rolio of
clossified loons (i.e. bod or doublful debls) to shoreholders funds wos 2300 per
cenl, while for lhe privote commerciol bonks, the rotio ronged between l5l per
ceni ond 282 pet cent. Merchonl bonks hod o rotio of over 200 per cenl.
Clossified loons for the whole indusiry were 45 per cent of totol loons ond
odvonces (Brownbridge, 1998), ond bV 1996, clossif ied loons of bonk hod
reoched N72 billion (Aloshi, 2002).
By 1993, 28 bonks

were identified

os insolvent ond o furiher 26 were in lhe eorly

3lhis wos increosed frorn N2ornillion to Nsornillion for

merchonl bonk.

commerclol bonks ond Nl2million to N,@rnitllon for
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stoges of disJress ond the CBN took over six slote-owned bonks. The polilicol
instobility with the onnulment of elections ond lhe toking-over of power by o
mililory regime did nol help motlers ond bonk runs were cleody evident by 1994.
This furlher exocerboted interesl roles ond inlerbonk rotes were over 100 percent
in 1994. ln o bid to restore some stobility in the finonciol syslem the government
re-introduced interesl role ond exchonge controls in 1994.
The Foiled Bonks (Recovery of Debls) ond Finonciol Molproclices Decree wos
promulgoled in '1994. The licences of 2 bonks were suspended in 1994 ond in 1995
17 privole bonks hod been ioken over by the CBN. while in the period hom 1992
to 1995. l0 stote bonks hod been loken over. ln 1995, the CBN estimoted thot 60
out of Il5 (effectively holt the number of bonk in the country) were distressed.
Overoll, 30 percenl of totol deposits ond 20 percenl of tolol ossets of the bonking
system were held by lhe insolvenl bonks.

lV.

Anolyflcol Fromewo*
The theorelicol fromework for our onolysis of the effects of finonciol liberolisotion
on finonciol frogility drows from Dell'Ariccio ond Morquez (2005), Looyzo ond
Ronciere (2004), Tornell ond Westermonn (2004) ond Demirguc-Kunt ond
Delrogioche (1999). Consequenfly, we moke use of o finonciol frogility equotion
ond include finonciol liberolisoiion ond some olher voriobles os explonotory
voriobles in lhe equolion.
The finonciol frogilily

equolion tokes ihe following form:

FRAGILITY, =ao+1.FINDEX, +a2INFLyoL, + aTGOVCON, + q.CASHBANK,

where

+€

(5)

finonciol frogility
Fl NDEX= f inonciol liberolisotion index
INFLVOL= volotility of inflotion
GOVCON= rolio of government consumplion to GDP
CASHBANK = bonk liquid reserves to bonk ossets rotio
e = enor lerm

FRAGILITY =

ond Ronciere, 2004) we hove
used the stondord deviotion of lhe growth role of domestic credit provided by
bonks. This vorioble is employed primorily becouse of the observed infrequenl.
shorp ond obrupt folls in credit growth ossocioied with frogility. These obrupt folls
in credil growth hove been observed fo occur during the bonking crisis thol ore
typicol of lhe boom-busl cycles ossocioted with finonciol liberolisoiion. The boom

To meosure frogility, following other sludies (Looyzo
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period sees ropid exponsion of bonk credit couded with extreme credit risk,
which leods to finonciol frogility ond leoves the finonciol syslem prone to crisis
(Loofzo ond Ronciere, 2004; Tornell ond Westermonn,2m4l'.
Finonciol liberolisolion is the primory explonolory vorioble of interest. lt is
increosingly being recognised thol the troditionol meosures of finonciol
development such os lhe brood money rotio, rotio of credil to the privote sector,
ond rolio of liquid liobilities do not give ony indicorion of the progression ond
instituiionol chonges involved in finonciol liberolisotion policies. Consequenlly,
recenl studies hove developed indexes thot exdicitly meosure the progression
mode with liberolisotion ond irock the different institutionol chonges involved with
reforms (Bondiero, el ol., 2000; Loeven, 2000; Arestis, et o..,20f2i Kominsky ond
Schmukler, 2002: Abiod, el ol., 2OO4). ln line with these studies, we hove
developed on index of finonciol liberolisollon (FINDEX) which is derived from ihe
melhod of principol componenls. Principol component onolysis is useful for
reducing lhe dimension of o doio sei ond extrocting the moin relotions from it.
This method hos been used in lhe finonciol liberolisotion literoture lo obtoin on
index which meosures the different phoses of the deregulotory ond inslitutionbuilding process (see Bondiero, et o1..2000). Whot we do is to idenlify seven
moior indicotors of moves towords liberolisotion which ore: bonk
denotionolisotion ond restructuring, inleresl rote liberolisotion, strenglhening of
prudentiol regulotion, obolition of directed credil, free entry into bonking. copitol
occount liberolisolion, ond stock morket liberolisoiion. We then ollocote 1o eoch
of lhese voriobles o volue of 0 prior to liberolisotion. After liberolisotion, the
indicolors toke on volues from I ond lhis increoses depending on lhe progress
mode for eoch specific liberolisotion policy. We get o motrix of 7 voriobles ond
then opply principol components onolysis. We use the first principol componenl
os our index of liberolisotion, ond this first component occounts tor 78% ol the
tolol vodotion.
Following Demirguc-Kunt ond Detrogioche (1998) the olher explonoiory voriobles
included in the finonciol frogility model ore the vololility of inflotion. the rotio of
government consumption to GDP, ond the rotio of bonk liquid reserves lo bonk
ossels. The volotiliiy of inflotion is included io toke occount of mocroeconomic
uncertointy. lncreosed mocroeconomic uncertointy ond o governmenl thot hos
lost conkol of monoging the economy con increose volotility in the finonciol
system ond, hence, bonking crisis. The governmenl consumption rotio is o proxy
for fiscol policy of lhe governmeni. A government whose fiscol position is in bod
shope moy not be oble to boil oul bonk experiencing difficulties ond this con
result in o full blown crisis os more bonks experience difficullies, The rotio of bonk
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liquid reserves to bonk ossels is used lo meosure liquidity of the bonking system.
Adverse mocroeconomic circumslonces should be less likely to leod lo crisis in
countries where the bonking syslem is liquid (Demirguc-Kunt & Detrogioche,
r998).

V.
V.l

Economeftlc Anoly3lt
l elhodology ond Dolo

The methodology thot will be employed in lhis poper is bosed on the
Autoregressive Diskibuted Log (ARDL) fromework of Pesoron, Shin ond Smith
(1996), Pesoron ond Shin (1999), ond Pesoron, Shin ond Smith (2ml). The ARDL
melhod hos o number of odvonloges over other cointegrolion techniques. First, it
ollows lhe use of voriobles lhot ore integroied of ditferent orders in estimoling
long-run relolionships. Specificolly, vodobles thot ore I (0) or I (l) con be included
in lhe some cointegroling equolion. Anolher odvontoge thot follows from this is
thol lhere is no need for unil root lesting of the voriobles. All thol is needed is ihot
the voriobles be either inlegroted of order 0 or I .
The ARDL procedure comprises of two steps. The firsi step involves testing the null

hypolhesis of no long-run relotionship omong the levels of ihe voriobles. ln order
to do lhis, on F-lest wilh o non-stondord dishibution is employed. Pesoron, Shin
ond Smilh (1996) hove provided two sels of osymplolic criticol volues for this lesl
for the coses when oll the voriobles ore I (l) ond for coses when oll voriobles ore I
(0). lf the compuled F-stotistic exceeds lhe upper criticol volue, then the null
hypothesis of no long-run relotionship con be reiected. On lhe other hond, if the
F-stolistic is lower thon the lower criticol volue, the null hypothesis connot be
reiecled. lf the F-slotislic folls within the upper ond lower bounds, lhen the result is
inconclusive ond lhere is o need for unil root tests to be conducled to oscertoin if
oll the voriobles ore l(l) ond l(0). lf oll voriobles ore either I (l ) or I (0), then lhe null
hypolhesis con be reiected, ond otherwise, lhe null hypothesis connot be
reiected.

lf o long run relolionship exists, then the second step con be implemented. This
involves eslimotion of the ARDL model using eilher the AIC or SBC lo selecl the
moximum order of logs to obtoin long run coefficients. This method involves the
estimotion of on enor conection model (ECM) of lhe ARDL model. lhus, equotion
5 obove hos to be chonged lo ihe ECM form. The finonciol frogility equotion now
becomes:
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LFRAGILITY, = a0

+Zd
,=l

6tLFRAGILITy,-,

+1a,,

A,FINDEXI,-,
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+1a,,

,=0

NNFLVOL,-, +

i=0

TI

la
i=0

r,

AGOVCON,-, +

a 2 FND

W l, -t

la.,
t.0

NASHBANK F, + a|RAGILITY! -t +

(5)

+ a, NFLVO L t _t + a $OYC O N, _t + a 5CAS H BANK, _l

Accordingly, the null hypothesis of no cointegrotion is lested ogoinst lhe
oltemotive using the F-tesl from Pesoron, Shin ond Smith (1995). The null
hypolheses for the equotion ore:
HO:Ot

=02=03=

Oa= Os=0

Annuol time series doto from the World Development lndicoiors (WDl) CD-ROM
2008 hove been used for the economeiric onolyses ond the doto ronges from
1970to2m5.

Y.2

Presentollon ond Dlscu$lon ot Resull3
We first conducted unil rool tests on the voriobles included in our model.
Although unit root tests ore not compulsory for ihe ARDL opprooch, we feel it is
slill necessory to moke sure thot oll the voriobles sotisfy the conditions under
which the ARDL opprooch con be employed, lhot is, thot oll vorioble be either
l(0) or l(l). The ougmenled Dickey-Fuller (ADF) ond Phillips-Penon (PP) unil rool
tests were conied oul for oll voriobles in the model ond lhe resulls ore presented
in Toble 2. From Toble 2, both lhe ADF ond PP lests show lhol three voriobles ore
integroted of order I . These voriobles ore: finonciol liberolisotion index, bonk
liquid reserves ond bonk ossels rotio, ond government consumplion. The two tesls
olso jointly conclude lhot one vorioble: volotility of inflotion is integroted of order
0. However, the two lesls give different results for the finonciol frogility vorioble.
While the ADF test suggests this vorioble is slotionory in levels, the PP lesl suggests
it is stolionory in first differences. However, since both lests come to the
conclusion ihot oll voriobles ore eilher I (0) or I (l ), lhe conditions for the ARDL
opprooch ore sotisfied.
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Toble 2: Unlt Rool Tertr
First Oifference

Levels

Variables

ADF

P?

Conclusion

{.59'

4.79.

r(0)/(1)

-3.52*r

t(r)

-2.71r*t

-3.49..
-6.16'

t(0)

SOVCOn

-r.u

-L.92

-5.53*

cashbank

-2.23

-2.51

4.t7.

-8.45*
-5.58*
-3.93*

ADF

PP

fragility

-3.21'1

findex
inflvol

-1.01

-2.52
-0.89

-2.75t'*

t(1)
t(1)

Notes: the null hypothesis for eoch column is the presence of unit roots.
l% level, significonl oi the 5% level,
signiflconl ol lhe l0% levet

' indicotes significont ot the

"

"'

oll lhe lesls were conducted wllh conslonl ond no lrend

We nexl conducl cointegrotion tesls to esioblish the existence of o long-run
relotionship between the voriobles by computing the F-slotislic for the ioinl
significonce of logged levels of lhe voriobles. Becouse onnuol dolo is used in lhis
onolysis, the moximum log lenglh wos set to two ond the Akoike lnformotion
Criterion (AlC) wos then used lo determine lhe oppropriote log lenglh. The Fslotislic obloined is 2.5429 ond this suggests the exislence of o long-run
relotionship between finonciol frogility ond lhe explonoiory voriobles. The Fslotistic folls within lhe lower ond upper bounds ol lhe 9V" significonce levela,
Since oll voriobles ore eilher I (0) or I (l) from Toble 2, we con conclude thot o
long-run relolionship exists for lhe voriobles in equolion 5.
Since ihe F-stolislics suggesl thot o cointegroting relotionship exisls between the
voriobles, we con now move on to lhe nexl stoge of the ARDL procedure by
estimoling equotion 6. The results of the regressions ore presented in equotions 7
lo 8.
The long-run coefficients ore presented in equotion 7 ond

we see thot finonciol

frogility is negotively reloted with finonciol liberolisolion. The finonciol liberolisotion
index hos o negotive coefficieni which is slotislicolly significont. This offers support
lor ihe lheory lhot finonciol liberolisolion induces finonciol frogility. The vorioble
meosuring lhe rolio of bonk liquid reserves to bonk ossets is posiiive ond
significonl ond this is os expecied, lhot finonciol frogility will be less likely to occur
the more liquid o bonking system is.
lThe crltlcol volue bounds ore from Toble B in Pesoron, Shin ond Smith (1996) (with on lntercepl ond no
trend). They ore 2.425-3.571,2.8*1.019, ond 3.817-5.122 ot the 9W.,95%, ond 99% significorrce levels,
respec tlvely.

8l
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FRAGILITY = -20.27 - 9.82FlNDEX + 0.12lNFLVOL

-

({.49) l-2.23l..* (0.09)

1.22GOVCON + 4.93CASHBANK

(-0.s6}

(4.s1}r

(7}

Notca:

' indicotes thot o coetlicienl is significont ot the
ond "' signifconf ot lhe l0 percent levei.
Figures in porenthesis ( ) qre

I percent

level,

"

significont ot lhe 5 percent level,

l{olios.

Equolion 8 presenls the eslimotes of the enor corection form of the ARDL model
ond lhe results ore quite similor wilh those from equotion 7. The coefficienl on lhe
dynomic componenl of the liberolisotion prory is signiricont negotive, thus
implying lhot short-run chonges in finonciol liberolisotion leod lo short-run

in

finonciol frogility. The volotility of inflotion ond govemmenl
rolio
consumption
ore insignificont, jusl like in the long-run estimolion. Also, the
rotio of bonk liquid reserves io bonk ossels is positive ond significont.
chonges

finonciol liberolisotion hos hod o negotive impoct on finonciol frogility in
boih the short ond long run in Nigerio. This result confirms whot wos observed
ofler Nigerio's finonciol liberolisoiion where the lending boom due to
indiscriminote lending herolded o period of bonking crisis. Our results ore
consistenl with the studies thot hove found finonciol liberolisolion os o
delerminont of finonciol frogility (Demirguc-Kunt ond Dekogioche, 1998, 2000;
Kominsky ond Reinhort, 1999). Although some studies find thot finonciol
liberolisotion should enhonce slobility in lhe long-run (Looyzo ond Ronciere, 2004;
Tornell ond Weslermonn, 2OO4l, out resulls ore in controsl with these os we find
lhot finonciol frogility still hos o significont negolive relotionship with finonciol
liberolisolion in lhe long-run.
Thus.

For the diognoslic lests,

lhe R2 is obout 0.54 which suggests o reosonoble fii of the
enor conection model to the dolo. The F-stolistic suggests the ioint significonce of
ihe explonotory voriobles, ond cruciolly, the enor coefficieni lerm (ecm(-l)) is
negotive ond slolislicolly significonl which shows thot lhe long run coefficienls
ore.lointly significont. This further supporis the existence of o long-run relotionship
between ihe voriobles. The coefficienl on the enor coneciion term (the speed of
odjuslment) of {.67 meons thot lhere is o quick odjustment bock io equilibrium
ofler o shock. Specificolly, the coefficienl implies thol oboul 677o of the previous
yeor's deviotion from long+un equilibrium will be conected within o yeor.
AFRAGILITY = -13.54AC + O.2TAFRAGILITY(-1)

(-0.48)

(1.83)r**

-

5.56AFINOEX + O.O8AINFLVOL

(-2.04)***

0.82A6ovcoN + 3.29CASHBANK -0.57ECM(-1)
(-0.s7)
(3.83)* (-4.9)*

-

(0.09)
(8)
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Adj. R'z= 0.54
OW = 2.36

F(6,27) = [0.001]
N016:

indicoies lhol o coefficieni is significont ol lhe I percenl level, *'significonl ol lhe 5 pe.cenl level,
ond *" significonl ol lhe l0 percenl level.
Figures in pcenlhesis { I ore t{oiios, [ ] ore ]volues.

'

V.3

Porometer Sloblllty Terl

We hove conducted poromeier stobilily tesls to ensure thot the estimoted
porometers of our model ore nol vorying over lime. This is imporlont becouse
unstoble porometers con result in o misspecif icotion of the model ond this could
leod lo biosed resulls (Honsen, 1992). Io lesl for porometer stobility we use ihe
cumulotive sum {CUSUM) ond cumulolive sum of squores (CUSUMSa) tesls given
in Pesoron ond Pesoron (1997). The null hypothesis of lhese lests is thot the
regression equotion is conectly specified. Figures I ond 2 present the cumulolive
sum {CUSUM) ond cumulotive sum of squores (CUSUMSA) grophs, respeclively, to
lest for model specificolion ond porometer constoncy. The pok of siroight lines in
eoch figure indicotes ihe 5 percent significonce level ond if the plotted CUSUM
ond CUSUMSQ grophs remoin inside lhe stroight lines the null hypothesis of
corect specificotion of the model con be occepted, oiherwise the null
hypothesis is rejecled ond il con be concluded thot the regression equotion is
misspecified. we see from the fwo figures thol the CUSUM ond CUSUMSQ plots
sloy within the lines indicoting lhe 5 percenl level of significonce ond we con,
therefore, conclude lhot our equotion hos been correclly specified ond there is
the obsence of instobility of the coefficients.
flgure

1: CUSUM Tert
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flgure 2: CUSUi SQ Test
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Conclu3lon

ln this poper we conducted on empiricol onolysis of lhe effects of finonciol
liberolisotion on finonciol frogility in Nigerio. Nigerio's finonciol liberolisolion storted
in 1987 ond this wos followed by o bonking crisis from the lote 1980s to eorly 1990s.
This is similor to the experiences of some Lolin Americon counlries ond hos
prompled some oulhors to osserl thot finonciol liberolisotion leods to finonciol
frogility.

ln order to properly meosure the groduol progression ond institulionol chonges
involved in finonciol liberolisolion, we developed on index which is o summory
meosure of seven (7) liberolisotion policies. The results of including this
liberolisotion index ond some conlrol voriobles in o finonciol frogility equotion
showed lhot finonciol kogility hos hod o negoiive relotionship with finonciol
liberolisotion in both the short-run ond long-run. This resull confirms whol wos
observed ofter Nigerio's finonciol liberolisolion where the lending boom due to
indiscriminole lending herolded o period of bonking crisis. Our results ore
consisient with the studies lhot hove found finonciol liberolisotion os o
determinonl of finonciol frogility (Demirguc-Kuni ond Detrogioche, 1998, 2000;
Kominsky ond Reinhort. 1 999).

90

Central Bank of Nigeria

Economic and Financial Review

March 2010

Referencer
Abiod, A., N. Oomes ond K. Uedo (2004) "The Quolity Effect: Does Finonciol
Liberolizotion lmprove the Allocolion of Copitol?". IMF Working Poper no.
WP/011112, Woshinglon D.C.: lnternotionol Monelory Fund.
Aloshi, S. O. (2002) "Process of Reslructuring ond Distress Resolution in

lhe Nigerion
Bonking lndustry", in H. Slein, O. Alokoiye, ond P. Lewis (eds.),
Deregulotion ond the funldng Cnses in Nigerio, Hompshire: Polgrove,
pp.72-93.

Arestis. P.. P. Demetriodes, B. Fottouh ond K. Mourotidis (2002) "The lmpoct of
Finonciol Liberolisotion Policies on Finonciol Development: Evidence from

Developing Economies", Discussion Popers

in

Economics no.02ll

,

Deporlmenl of Economics, University of Leicester.
Bondiero. O., G. Coprio, P. Honohon ond F. Schiontorelli (2000) "Does Finonciol
Reform Roise or Reduce Soving?", 7he Review of Economics ond Slofistfcs,
8212), pp.239-263.
Beck, T., R. Levine ond N. Loofzo (2000) "Finonce ond lhe Sources of Growlh",
Joumol of Finonciol Economics,58, pp.25l -300.
Brownbridge, M. (1998) "The lmpoct of Public Policy on the Bonking System in
Nigerio", in M. Brownbridge ond C. Horvey (eds.), Bonking in Aftico,
Oxford: .Jomes Curry, pp. 103-125.
Coprio, G. ond D. Klingebiel (1996) "Bonk lnsolvencies: Cross-country Experience",
Policy Reseorch Working Poper no. WPS\620, Woshinglon D.C.: World
Bonk.

Centrol Bonk of Nigerio (2004) ''Nigerio: Moior Economic, Finonciol ond Bonking
lndicotors", Abuio: Cenkol Bonk of Nigerio.
Dell'Ariccio, G. ond R. Morquez (2005) "tending Booms ond Lending Slondords",
mimeo.
Demirguc-Kuni. A. ond E. Detrogioche (1998) "The Determinonls of Bonking Crises
in Developing ond Developed Countries", IMF Sloff Popers, vol.45, no.l.
Woshington D.C.: lnlernolionol Monetory Fund.
Demirguc-Kunl, A. ond E. Detrogioche (l 999) "Finonciol Liberolizotion ond
Finonciol Frogility", in B. Pleskovic ond J.E. Sliglitz (eds.), Annuol World tunk
Conference on Development Economics 1998, Woshinglon D.C.: World
Bonk.

Demirguc-Kunl, A. ond E. Detrogioche (2000) "Moniloring Bonking Seclor Frogility:
A Mutivoriole Logit Approoch", world Bonk Economic Review, vol.l4,

pp.287-{7.
^o.2,
Dioz-Alejondro. C. (1985) "Good-bye Finonciol Repression, Hello Finonciol Crosh",
Journol of Developmenl Economics, vol.l9, pp.l-21.

Fou/oq/e: Finaacial Liberalisatioo aod Finaocial Frelility irl Nigeria

91

(1977) Finonciol lntermediotion ond Economic Growih in LessDeveloped Counlries: A Theoreticol Approoch. Joumol of Development
Studies, vol. 13, pp.58-72.
Honsen, 8.E. ll992l "Tests for Porometer Stobflity in Regressions with l(l ) Processes".
Joumal of Business ond Economic Sfofisfics, l0(3), pp.32l-335.
Kominsky. G.L. ond C.M. Reinhorl (1999) "Ihe Twin Crises: The Couses of Bonking
ond Bolonce-Of-Poyments Problems", The Ameicon Economic Review,
Golbis,

V.

vol.89, no.3, pp.473-500.

Kominsky, G.L. ond S.L. Schmukler (2002) "Short-Run Poin, Long-Run Goin: The

Effecls

of

Finonciol Liberolizolion", Polrcy Reseorch Working

Pocp-r

no.WPS2g12, Woshinglon D.C.: Wodd Bonk.

King, R.G. ond R. Levine (1993) "Finonce ond Growth: Schumpeier Might be
Right". Quorlerly Joumol of Economics, vol.l08, no.3, pp.717-737
Loeven. L. (2000) "Does Finonciol Liberolizotion Relox Finoncing Constroints on
Fims?" , Wotld Bonk Policy Reseorch Working Poper WPS 2467 , Woshington
D.C.: World Bonk.
Lewis, P. ond H. Stein (2002) "Ihe Polilicol Economy of Finonciol Liberolizotion in
Nigerio", in H. Stein, O. Ajokoiye, ond P. Lewis (eds.), Deregulolion ond
the Bonking Crises in Nigenb, Hompshire: Polgrove, pp.21-52.
Looyzo, N. ond R. Ronciere (2004) "Finonciol Developmenl, Finonciol Frogility,
ond Growlh", Working Poper no WPS343 I, Woshinglon D.C.: World Bonk.

McKinnon, R.l. (1923) Money ond Copitol in Economic Development. Woshington
D.C.: The Brookings lnstitution
Pogono, M. (1993) Finonciol Morkels ond Growth: An Overview, Europeon
Economic Review. vol.37 , pp.613-622.
Pesoron, M.H., Y. Shin ond R..J. Smilh (1995) "Testing for the Existence of o LongRun Relolionship". DAE Working Popers no.9622, University of Combridge
Deportment of Applied Economics.
Pesoron, M. H. ond Y. Shin (1999) "An Auloregressive Distributed Log Modelling
Approoch to Cointegrotion Anolysis". in S.Storm (ed.), Econome,nbs ond
Economic lheory in the 20h Century: the Rognor Frisch Cenlenniol
Syrnposium, chopler I I , Combridge: Combridge University Press.
Pesoron, M. H., Y. Shin ond R.J. Smith (2001) "Bounds Testing Approoches lo the
Anolysis of Level Relotionships", Journol of Applbd Econornerncs, vol.l5,
pp.289-326.
Pesoron, M. H. ond B. Pesoron ll997l "Working with Microfit 4.0", Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Ronciere, R., A. Tornell ond F. Westermonn (2005) "Systemic Crises ond Growth",
NBER Working Poper no.l1076, Combtidge: Notionol Bureou of Economic
Reseorch.

'luog
ppoM
:'f,'o
uolourqsoM
oto)tput
weLudop^eo
wo/ ,, lroc,zl luDS puoM
'r9t
puo qr oj9 'uo[ozloreqr-l
Jadod 6uuJot\
",
ol,9)
l'ou
(tooz) uuor.lJelseM 'l puo v 'lpurol
lorcuourj uee^ le8 lurl earsod eql, ",s3su3
'ssejd 4!ee^run p/olxo
'NAJ.rdo€^eo
p!3uout! (€l6t) 's 'l '/r^or{s
:lJoA
)M)ouo)f
ut
ouluadeao
^^eN
'sssJd l+lsle^lun pJoruoH
:e6puquo3 'a,ol:) ssauFng aql puo 'gaaqt 'l!por) 'lol!do) stllord
olut tunbq uV :peLudop^ao cltuouoq lo Aroeql eql (Zl6t) 'V 'f 'reladlunLlos
0l0z rlrrDhl

Alar^rN lPrru?u!J Pue JruouorS

ErreSrNJo ry?g

lEJueJ

z6

